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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation reveals that landlords and
real estate lenders who are wary of dealing with charter schools may perceive the
schools as much riskier clients than they actually are.
This report comes at a time when real estate issues are taking center stage in the
growing charter movement. For many charter schools—independent public schools
started by local citizens—simply securing an adequate building for the long term
can be a major hurdle. Although charters represent a growth market for lenders,
developers, and the like, affordable deals are often hard to come by—in part
because this is a fairly new and unusual kind of market, and the risks of a school
failing or defaulting are not well understood.
In research meant to clarify the picture, the Kauffman Foundation arrived at several
key findings:
n Existing data on charter school closings are generally accurate, but can be
misleading to lenders and investors because the figures don’t take into
account real estate issues. For instance, one commonly cited survey appears
to show that nearly one in ten charter schools have “closed.” But the schools
thus counted include many that just changed organizational structure, and
continued to occupy and pay on their buildings. The Kauffman Foundation
calculates that in fact, fewer than 6 percent have failed to do so.
n Even when buildings are prematurely vacated, the vast majority are able to
be leased or sold to others on terms no less favorable to the lender or
landlord. (Another common concern is that facilities fitted out as schools may
not be easy to re-market. But the current rate of re-use on equivalent terms is
more than 95 percent.)
n Certain factors, when present, can greatly reduce overall risk. Charter
schools started in conjunction with Education Management Organizations
(EMOs) were found to have almost negligible failure rates, even if the contract
with the EMO is later terminated. Also, charter schools with more students
are less risky than average, as are those started one year or more after the
home state passes a charter law.
n Finally, and ironically, the inability to find adequate buildings is itself a key
contributor to charter school failures. Thus the whole dilemma is to some
extent circular: securing a long-term lease or mortgage helps a charter
school to stabilize, attract students and survive—but many cannot strike such
a deal because of concerns that they won’t survive.
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INTRODUCTION
About Charter Schools and Real Estate Issues
Since the first state charter laws were passed in Minnesota in 1991, some 3,400
charter schools have been launched in various states across the United States.
About that many more are expected to open over the next five to six years. Typically
they are started by local parents, teachers, and/or civic leaders seeking different
approaches, and thus more choices, in education. For instance charter schools may
differ from other nearby schools by having longer or non-standard school days, by
adopting special teaching methods, or by being “themed” to emphasize certain
subjects or modes of learning.
Charter schools are independent, with their own boards of directors and budgets,
but they are public schools. They receive per-pupil operating funds from the districts
and states in which they are located (though typically at less than 100 percent of
the equivalent cost of educating students in other public schools). In addition,
charters are often treated as “Local Educational Agencies,” or their own school
districts, but lack the tax base and bonding authority of traditional district authorities.
In return for their freedom and funding they usually must take all neighboring
students who apply (with an impartial selection device, such as a lottery, used if
there are more applicants than openings), and they must meet agreed-upon
performance measures: each state has its own guidelines in all these matters.
Facilities can be a problem for several reasons. Rarely is a vacant school building
available in good condition and in a suitable location. Often a space must be
adapted or upgraded, which adds to the expense. Some charter schools have
benefactors to help pay for a facility or even donate one, but most, especially in
lower-income areas, do not. Many schools cope by growing in stages—starting out
with grades K–2, for example, and planning to expand year-by-year to K–5 or K–8.
Among other benefits, this can minimize capital costs at startup by requiring only a
small space initially. The idea is to move to larger quarters as funding grows along
with the student population. Since moving repeatedly is distracting and costly in its
own right, the school should settle into a long-term lease or mortgage on a full-
sized facility as soon as possible. But that step often proves to be the most elusive.
Low-cost, charity-rate loans and mortgages for large amounts are scarce. And on
the conventional market, charter schools tend to encounter additional charges
rather than discounts. Lenders and landlords, in dealing with an unfamiliar type of
applicant, may naturally try to cover the perceived risk by asking for extra loan
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guarantees, security deposits, and/or premium rates—which the schools, in many
cases, cannot afford.
Some nonprofits and public agencies have started loan-guarantee funds to help
charter schools meet lenders’ requirements (one such public program, sponsored by
the Department of Education, we review on page 8). Such efforts can be useful, but
in studying them, the Kauffman Foundation noticed something else that leapt out.
The “perceived risk” levels appeared to be unusually high (perhaps because of the
relative funding disadvantages charters confront and that were described earlier).
As a result, some lenders and landlords could be missing out on deals that could
have been made, by trying to cover more risk than they actually faced. And perhaps
many well-conceived charter schools were missing out on buildings they could have
paid for, if the bar were not set too high. Further study has indicated that this may
indeed be the case.
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KAUFFMAN FINDINGS ON REAL ESTATE RISK
The Kauffman Foundation’s data analysis on this topic was directed by Robert Litan,
vice president of research and policy, and conducted by research and policy
associate Leslie Lukens. The work carried out over several months in early 2005.
The Kauffman Foundation team was greatly assisted by the Center for Education
Reform (CER), which provided data and technical advice for this study.
Here are our findings on several key issues.
Existing studies were not meant to look at charter schools from a real
estate perspective, and can be misread to overstate the risk.
Perhaps the most widely used source of statistics is the 2004 edition (published in
May) of the report “Charter Schools Today: Changing the Face of American
Education; Statistics, Stories, and Insights,” from the Center for Education Reform,
which tracks virtually all charter school closings in the United States through the
2002–2003 school year. The CER report indicates that 9.41 percent of all charter
schools have “closed”—but the figure should not be used for gauging real estate
risk. It needs to be adjusted downward for that purpose; the Kauffman Foundation
suggests that a more accurate figure would be slightly less than 6 percent.
First, it is important to note that the percentage in the CER report is not an annual
rate. If more than 9 percent (or even 6 percent) of charter schools closed every
year, they would be risky ventures indeed, but that is not the case. Percentages
measured by CER (and by the Kauffman Foundation) are cumulative counts. They
represent how many charter schools have closed thus far out of all such schools
that have ever existed in the United States since 1991.
Second, the CER definition of a “closed” or “failed” charter school is very broad. The
schools counted as such may no longer be operating in their original form—that is,
as independently run charter schools—but not all of them actually closed down, nor
by any means did all of them default on building leases or mortgages. Researchers
at the Kauffman Foundation examined the underlying data and re-ran the
calculations, excluding all events that did not involve real estate risk. Excluded, for
instance, were:
n Charter schools that were absorbed into their local school districts, but
continued to occupy and use their buildings. (A school of this kind essentially
becomes a “regular” public school—the district operates it, and takes financial
responsibility for it.) 
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n Charter schools that merged with other institutions, but again continued to
occupy and use their buildings for educational purposes.
n Charter schools that closed because they were unable to obtain an adequate
facility. These were cases that obviously did not pose any risk to a lender or
landlord. They included schools failing to get even an initial lease or
mortgage, as well as schools forced out of their existing facilities and unable
to secure new ones. (For example: the landlord terminated or did not renew a
short-term lease, or safety inspectors closed the facility, or the school had
outgrown its space and disbanded after not finding larger quarters in time.) 
Adjusting the CER data to remove cases like those listed here, the Kauffman
Foundation found the cumulative real estate risk to be not 9.41 percent, but rather
5.95 percent. That is:
Using data from the latest CER report, Kauffman finds that of all charter
schools that have ever opened in this country, 5.95 percent have closed in a
way that impacted their landlords or real estate financers.
Even when charter schools actually fail, the re-use rate of facilities is 
very high.
With CER data plus follow-up telephone surveys, the Kauffman Foundation was
able to determine what happened to the facilities of 106 charter schools that had
actually closed and vacated their premises, which represents approximately one-
third of all closed charter schools. The great majority of buildings and spaces—95.8
percent—were in use by new occupants. State education officials reported that
landlords faced no loss in nearly all of these cases and were able to re-lease the
facilities at equal or higher rates to the new tenants. So few facilities remained
empty at the time of the survey that it was not possible to make a meaningful study
of the losses, if any, incurred in those situations: the sample was too small.
This finding suggests that one of the chief “downside” risks feared by many
landlords and lenders—inability to re-market the space easily, in case a charter
school defaults—should in fact not be a major concern.
Having a long-term facility solution reduces the risk of charter school
failure.
As already shown, some charters fail, ironically, precisely because they cannot
lease or buy adequate facilities. Of the 317 charter schools listed as “closed” in 
the latest CER report, 33—more than 10 percent—reported closing for lack of a
suitable property.
Owning a building is the best long-term solution. In follow-up studies, the Kauffman
Foundation was able to get detailed reports on facility status for over 1,800 charter
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schools, more than half of the nearly 3,400 that have ever opened in the United
States.
n Of the 109 schools in the Kauffman Foundation sample that had closed, only
five (4.58 percent) actually owned or had a mortgage on their building at the
time of closing.
n By contrast, of the 1,703 schools in the sample that were still open, 490—
28.77 percent—owned or had mortgages on their buildings.
For practical purposes a long-term lease—of ten years or more—is nearly
equivalent to ownership. Altogether (see Figure 1 below), 42.8 percent of the
currently-open charter schools in the Kauffman Foundation sample either owned or
had long-term leases on their facilities. That is the good news.
The ominous news is that 47.2 percent of the charter schools in the Kauffman
Foundation survey sample—804 of 1,703—had only short-term leases. These
schools may have adequate spaces at present but do not have homes assured for
the future—they are the schools living on the cusp, the ones that will need to find
such homes before long.
The remaining 9.9 percent of the schools in the Kauffman Foundation sample, 169
of 1,703, had facilities “provided” for them—for instance by private benefactors, by
nonprofit partners, or (in some cases) by local school districts. The arrangements
vary. Some of these schools can count on long-term homes, but others are being
housed on an ad hoc basis. Like the charter schools with short-term leases, they
too may soon be in the hunt for other and more permanent facilities.
These data strongly suggest, therefore, that lenders and landlords approached by
charter schools should certainly weigh all risks—but weigh them accurately, and
keep in mind that the willingness to provide a long-term facility on affordable terms
is, itself, a key risk-reduction factor.
Other risk-reduction factors are summarized on following pages.
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Figure 1. Status of Building of Open Charter Schools
The presence of an EMO at startup dramatically reduces the risk of charter
school failure.
EMOs are entities that will manage a school, on a contract basis, for the directors of
that school. Typically they offer a pre-developed pedagogic model plus
administrative experience. EMOs exist in both for-profit and not-for-profit forms, and
most provide turnkey contracting—that is, they can handle all aspects of starting
and running a school—though some may be engaged for only parts of the task.
The Kauffman Foundation studied 413 charter schools started in conjunction with
for-profit EMOs, and found that only two of the 413 have closed—a nearly negligible
rate of less than 0.5 percent. Interestingly, this was true even though a significant
number of the schools (39 of the 413) had later terminated their original EMO
contracts and shifted to self-management or some other form of management. Thus
the conclusion is that having an EMO at startup is the key risk-reduction factor.
The Kauffman Foundation team focused on for-profit EMOs because a rich dataset
on their charter schools was available from a 2004 study by scholars at Arizona
State University. The Foundation’s hypothesis is that nonprofit EMOs would offer
similar risk reduction since their services and features, aside from the nonprofit
status, are similar.
Although it has not yet been determined exactly why an EMO at startup reduces
risk, some obvious possibilities present themselves. One reason may simply be that
the EMO’s experience helps a new school get established on a sound footing. Also,
the EMO provides “another set of eyes” at the pre-launch screening stage. While
every plan for a new charter school must be approved by a state board, the
involvement of an EMO means that an interested third party has judged the basic
idea to be viable, figuring that there will be sufficient demand for a new charter
school in the given location, and so forth. Finally, EMO-run charter schools tend to
be larger than average, which also correlates with lower risk (see the next section).
On the other hand, it is possible that the EMO itself, as distinct from the school, can
fail. The most notable instance was the August 2004 failure of California Charter
Academy, a regional for-profit EMO in California. Charter schools managed by this
firm were not included in the Kauffman Foundation’s studies as it was not yet clear
what the real estate consequences would be. The message here is that basic due
diligence on the EMO is in order. In general, however:
Kauffman’s findings strongly indicate that charter schools started by EMOs
pose very low risk to lenders and landlords.
It is not true that “most charter schools will eventually fail but are too new
to have failed yet.”
Given the relative newness of the charter movement, another common concern is
that most of the schools just haven’t had sufficient time to fail. The Kauffman
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Foundation tested this belief by sifting the CER data to remove all schools younger
than five years. Five years is a sensible break-point because most charter schools
are reviewed by their states for charter renewal at that stage, and schools that are
doing poorly may be dissolved then.
Kauffman Foundation analysis showed that for charter schools more than five years
old, the cumulative historic closing rate is indeed higher than the all-school average.
By CER standards, 13.79 percent of the charter schools reaching an age of five
years or more had “closed” compared to 9.41 percent of all charters. Adjusting
those figures (as described earlier) to correct for charter schools that had simply
been merged, re-absorbed by their school districts, or otherwise “closed” in a way
that did not affect real estate risk, the Kauffman Foundation found that the more-
than-five-years-old cumulative risk rate was 8.6 percent, compared to 5.95 percent
for all charters.
So there does appear to be higher mortality down the line rather than early in life for
charter schools. However, the magnitude of the difference does not come close to
suggesting that “most” or even a large minority of charters is on track for eventual
failure. And as the Kauffman Foundation’s studies have shown, a significant number
of midlife failures are the result of real estate problems—not a cause of them.
Ideally, the Kauffman Foundation would like to have had data on default or loss
experience of conventional lenders and bondholders who have provided financing
for charter school facilities, either directly to individual schools or to their lessors.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of a comprehensive database that has this
information, though anecdotal evidence suggests that defaults by charter school
borrowers have been rare. In the meantime, however, providers of credit
enhancement can reduce the risks that lenders or bondholders may confront. This is
the last subject to which we now turn.
Federal credit enhancement for charter schools has been helpful but is not
likely to be the sole answer.
Recognizing the importance of ensuring sound financing for charter schools, the
Department of Education (DOE) has established a “Credit Enhancement for Charter
School Facilities Program” that channels funds, on a competitive basis, to other
organizations to “credit enhance” charter school loans or leases. So far, Congress
has appropriated approximately $125 million for this program. A key advantage of
the program is that it uses federal money as the “last dollars” in, and thus leverages
federal support with private money (conservatively, five dollars of private money for
every one dollar of federal support).
Though the DOE’s credit enhancement program is clearly critical to filling the
financing gap for charter schools, it is not likely to be the only answer, especially if
the demand to create charter schools continues to grow.
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CONCLUSIONS
Charter schools are not without risk, and the Kauffman Foundation does not
recommend that every application for a lease or mortgage should be approved.
However, as this Kauffman Foundation study proves, the actual real estate risks of
dealing with charter schools are easily over-estimated. It is likely that more deals
could be struck that are beneficial to all concerned if the risks are properly
understood.
In particular, risk analysis and underwriting standards should take account of the
following key findings:
n Charter school “closing” and “failure” rates in existing studies need to be
adjusted—usually downward—for purposes of assessing real estate risk.
n Most charter school closings do not leave landlords and lenders with white-
elephant facilities that are hard to re-market. On the contrary, the vast
majority of such buildings are re-marketed on good terms.
n Simply offering to provide a long-term facility at affordable rates removes a
key “cause” of charter school failure, thus helping to ensure both the survival
and solvency of the school.
n Charter schools that have been started in conjunction with EMOs pose
extremely low risk. Larger schools, and schools started under mature state
charter laws, also are less risky than average.
n Credit enhancement providers have an important role to play in reducing the
risks that conventional lenders and bondholders confront in financing charter
school facilities.
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About the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
A private, nonpartisan foundation that became fully funded after the death 
of donor Ewing Marion Kauffman in 1993, the Kauffman Foundation conducts
research and grant-making programs in two fields of interest: educational
achievement (focused on K–12 math and science performance in Greater
Kansas City) and advancing entrepreneurship across America.
Until recently, the Kauffman Foundation’s chief involvement with charter
schools has been through educational programs for low-income urban youth 
in the Kansas City area: all programs offered to students at traditional public
schools are offered to charter school students as well. However in the past
year, specific attention has turned to the national charter movement. One
reason is that a number of charter experiments have produced education
models that appear to work well, and are worth propagating. Another is the
belief that the Kauffman Foundation, with its expertise in the entrepreneurial
process, could help address practical issues affecting these “entrepreneurial”
schools. This study of real estate risk is an example.
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